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Cates v. Cates: Illinois' "Solution" to Tort
Litigation Between Parents and Children
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1891, the Supreme Court of Mississippi created the doctrine of
parent-child tort immunity.' Citing no authority,2 the court held that
parents are immune from tort actions brought by their minor, unemancipated children.3 Following Mississippi's lead, most American courts
eventually forbade tort litigation between parents and their children.4
An Illinois court recognized parent-child tort immunity only four
years after Mississippi.' Gradually, the Illinois judiciary strayed from
implementing the doctrine in its purest form. 6 As in other jurisdic1. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). In its most comprehensive form,
the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity bars actions brought by minor, unemancipated children against their parents and actions brought by parents against their minor,
unemancipated children. See David L. Grobart, Parent-ChildTort Immunity in Illinois,
17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 303, 303 n.1 (1986). The terms "parental immunity," "parent-child
tort immunity," and "parent-child immunity" have been used to describe the general rule
created by Mississippi. Throughout this Note, these terms will be used interchangeably.
2. Unlike many rules of law, the doctrine of parent-child immunity is not a descendant of English common law. Grobart, supra note 1, at 305. Although there are no
decisions stating so, there is no reason to think that English common law would not
permit actions for personal torts committed in the context of a parent-child relationship. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 904
(5th ed. 1984).
English law gave a parent legal custody of a child, but the child retained a separate
legal identity. Id. For instance, the law entitled children to the benefits of their own
property. Id. In matters affecting property, the law freely recognized causes of action
brought by children against their parents and vice versa. Id. Furthermore, in tort,
children were responsible for bringing their own causes of action against other parties
and, in turn, were held liable for their own torts. Id. Thus, English common law would
probably have recognized intrafamilial tort actions as well. PROSSER & KEETON, supra, §
122, at 904; see also William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1056-63 (1930).
3. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887. The Hewellette court stated, "But so long as the parent is
under obligation to care for, guide, and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained." Id.
4. Grobart, supra note 1, at 303. Citing a case from virtually every state, Grobart
observed that "parental immunity once enjoyed almost universal acceptance in American
courts." Id.
5. Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill.
App. 577 (1895). According to the court, it was "doubtless
the law" that a child could not bring an action alleging parental maltreatment. Id. at
580; see also Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164, 169 (1933).
6. See infra notes 50-97 and accompanying text; see also Grobart, supra note 1, at
313-318 (characterizing Illinois' treatment of parental immunity as a "gradual erosion
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tions, Illinois courts have carved out several exceptions to the original
rule.7 For example, Illinois courts have allowed intrafamilial suits
when the plaintiffs alleged willful and wanton misconduct.' Illinois
courts have also disregarded the doctrine in situations where the
alleged wrongful conduct fell outside the scope of the family relationship, 9 or where the tortfeasor's death actually dissolved the family
relationship.' ° Furthermore, where the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty
to the general public, Illinois courts have prohibited the immunity
defense." Finally, Illinois courts have permitted derivative
third-party
2
actions seeking contribution from negligent parents.'
In recent years, the growing number of exceptions to the parental
immunity doctrine has perplexed both courts and litigants in Illinois.' 3
In Cates v. Cates,'4 the Illinois Supreme Court finally addressed this
confusion as it tried to create a modem solution to the problems that
arise in tort litigation between family members.'5 Without fully abandoning the doctrine, the court proposed a new standard to clarify when
parent-child immunity is a viable defense.' 6
This Note first reviews the origin and tradition of parent-child tort
immunity.' 7 It then discusses the adoption and gradual erosion of
parental immunity in Illinois.' 8 It also describes three modem
approaches followed in jurisdictions that have abrogated immunity in
actions between parents and children.' 9 The Note then analyzes the
Illinois Supreme Court's most recent treatment of parent-child tort
of the absolute prohibition").
7. See infra notes 61-97 and accompanying text.
8. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (I11.
1956). The Nudd exception was the only
one of Illinois' exceptions carved out by the Illinois Supreme Court. All of Illinois'
other exceptions first appeared in intermediate appellate courts. For a detailed discussion of the Nudd decision, see infra notes 62-69.
9. Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12 (I11.
App. Ct. 1968); see infra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text.
10. Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778 (I11.
App. Ct. 1972); see infra notes 83-86
and accompanying text.
11. Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (I11.
App. Ct. 1978); see infra notes 7882 and accompanying text.
12. Larson v. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221 (I11.
App. Ct. 1982); see infra notes 87-92
and accompanying text.
13. See Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 722-23 (I11.
1993), aff'g 588 N.E.2d 330
(I11.
App. Ct. 1992).
14. 619 N.E.2d 715, 722-23 (I11.
1993), aff'g 588 N.E.2d 330 (II1. App. Ct. 1992).
15. Id. at 728-29.
16. Id.
17. See infra part II.A.
18. See infra part II.B.
19. See infra part II.C.
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immunity in Cates v. Cates.20 Finally, this Note predicts how the
Cates decision will impact future tort litigation between parents and
children in Illinois. 21
II. BACKGROUND
A. The "Great Trilogy": The Origin of
Parent-ChildTort Immunity
The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity had its beginnings in
three decisions reached by state high courts near the turn of the
century. 2 2 In Hewellette v. George,2 3 the Supreme Court of
Mississippi initiated a century of controversy over whether the
American legal system has a place for tort litigation between immediate
family members.24 In Hewellette, Sallie Hewellette, a minor, brought
an action against her mother for false imprisonment.25 Married but
separated from her husband, Sallie alleged that her mother wrongfully
confined her in an insane asylum for eleven days.26 At trial, a jury
awarded damages to Sallie.2 ' The supreme court, however, remanded
20. See infra parts III-IV.
2 1. See infra part V.
22. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W.
664 (Tenn. 1903); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905). These three state court
opinions are together known as the "great trilogy" and form the genesis of parent-child
tort immunity. Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare
the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 1161, 1162-63 (1991). According
to these authors:
The "great trilogy" established the theoretical underpinnings for parental tort
immunity. The justifications advanced for parental tort immunity were many
and varied and included: a) the state's interest in maintaining and preserving
family harmony, b) the fear of fraudulent, collusive claims, c) the protection
of family finances, d) the protection of parental discretion and authority, and
e) the analogy to spousal immunity.
Id. at 1163 (footnotes omitted).
23. 9 So. at 887.
24. See Rooney, supra note 22, at 1162-66. As the authors stated: "Although adoption of parental tort immunity swept the country, criticism of the doctrine followed
shortly thereafter." Id. at 1163. Throughout the United States, jurisdictions often
disagreed on whether the traditional justifications for parental immunity held up to judicial scrutiny. Id. Thus, Mississippi's absolute prohibition of tort actions between
parents and children did not last long as a uniform rule throughout the United States. Id.
Instead, courts began to develop distinctively different approaches to determine whether
to permit such litigation. Id.; see also Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A
Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 508-11 (1982)
(discussing exceptions to the absolute parent-child immunity rule).
25. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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the case to determine whether the
28 defendant supported the minor at the
time of the false imprisonment.
The supreme court explained that an unemancipated child cannot
bring a tort action against her parent. 29 The court reasoned that minor
children who depend on their parents for guidance and support have a
reciprocal obligation to obey their parents.30 The court also stated that
a sound public policy, designed to protect the best interests of society
and families, forbids minor children from seeking compensation for
personal injuries allegedly caused by their parents. 3' Furthermore, the
court explained that the criminal laws of a state sufficiently protect
unemancipated children from intentional parental violence.32
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court of Tennessee followed
Mississippi's lead by adopting the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity. In McKelvey v. McKelvey, 33 a minor child brought an action for
civil damages against her father and stepmother. 34 Appealing the trial
court's dismissal of her action, the child alleged that her stepmother,
with the consent of her father, inflicted cruel and inhumane treatment
upon her.35 The supreme court, however, agreed with the reasoning
28. Id. The Hewellette court apparently conditioned the use of the parental immunity
defense upon proof that the child was "unemancipated." Emancipation of a minor child
"involves an entire surrender of the right to the care, custody, and earnings of such child
as well as a renunciation of parental duties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (6th ed.
1990). Thus, in Hewellete, immunity would not have been a viable defense if the plaintiff had been self-sufficient or financially dependent on her estranged husband.
Hewellette, 9 So. at 887. Furthermore, it appears from Hewellene that emancipation
which occurs through a process other than reaching a majority age is not necessarily
permanent. The Hewellente court indicated that a formerly emancipated minor who has
again become financially dependent on a parent is considered unemancipated and subject
to the parental immunity doctrine. Id.
29. Hewellene, 9 So. at 887.
30. Id.
3 1. Id. The court's exact words were as follows:
[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and control, and
the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such
action as this can be maintained. The peace of society, and of the families
composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the
repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal
injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id.
32. Id. "The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection
from parental violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to
demand." Hewellene, 9 So. at 887.
33. 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
34. Id.
35. Id. Although the plaintiff's stepmother inflicted the cruel treatment, the court
stated that the father would be the responsible party if he allowed such mistreatment. Id.
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set forth in Hewellette.36 Convinced that the state's criminal laws
provided sufficient protection from family violence, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal. 3' Furthermore, by drawing an
analogy to the policy of spousal immunity,38 the court reiterated
Mississippi's conclusion that actions by children against parents would
disrupt family unity and societal peace.39
In the final case of the "great trilogy," the Supreme Court of
Washington held in Roller v. Roller" that a minor plaintiff allegedly
raped by her father had no right to civil redress. 41 In Roller, the
defendant father contended that his minor, unemancipated daughter
Curiously, instead of directly addressing the issue of whether parental immunity protects
stepparents, the court proceeded as if the stepmother had acted as an agent for the plaintiffs father. Id.
In modern courts, the issue of whether to afford immunity to those standing in loco
parentis has become a recurrent one. Prosser and Keeton indicate that actions are nearly
always permitted against one who is not a parent but who merely stands in place of one,
such as a stepparent or another person with custody of the child. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2, at 905; see also Larson v. Independent Sch. Dist., 289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn.
1979) (holding that despite having temporary custody or control of the child, schools
do not fall within the doctrine's scope and will be held liable for negligence); Rayburn
v. Moore, 241 So. 2d 675 (Miss. 1970) (refusing to afford immunity to a defendant
stepfather because there were no reciprocal obligations of support and obedience
between the stepfather and the plaintiff stepdaughter). But see Mitchell v. Davis, 598
So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992) (extending the doctrine of parental immunity to foster parents);
Foley v. Foley, 61 I11.App. 577 (1895) (holding that the doctrine applies to those
taking the place of a parent).
36. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 665. Many courts analogize parental immunity to spousal immunity. See,
e.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); Luster v. Luster, 13 N.E.2d 438 (Mass.
1938). These courts theorize that any litigation between immediate family members
would disrupt family harmony. Downs, 216 A.2d at 32; Luster, 13 N.E.2d at 439-440.
Nevertheless, this analogy seems misplaced in light of the contrasting theories underlying spousal immunity and parental immunity. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, at
905. The common law considered the spousal relationship a single entity under the
husband's control and management. Grobart, supra note 1, at 309. Thus, a wife could
not enter into a contract, convey property, or bring a cause of action without the joinder
of her husband. Id. Furthermore, because each spouse was not an independent legal
entity, no actions could be brought by one spouse against the other. Id; see also
William E. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 303307 (1959) (discussing the rationale behind the common law prohibition of actions by
one spouse against another).
Conversely, at common law, parents and children did not share a single legal identity.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, at 904. Instead, the law considered children separate
legal persons capable of maintaining property and entering into contracts. Id. Thus,
using spousal immunity as a justification for parent-child tort immunity seems somewhat illogical and problematic.
39. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664.
40. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
41. Id.
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had no right to sue for a tort committed by a parent. 42 In an attempt to
refute the public policy justification that such actions would disturb
family unity, the plaintiff argued that her father's violent conduct had
already disturbed the harmony of the Roller family.43
The supreme court rejected this argument, deeming it impossible to
abolish the doctrine in some cases and not others." The court
explained that the judicial system must rely instead on uniform principles of law, especially those that prevent "disturbing confusion" over
when to allow parent-child litigation.45
The Roller court also offered financial reasons for prohibiting such
actions. 46 In the event of a judgment, the court suggested, other minor
children in the family would eventually inherit less from a liable
parent's estate.47 Furthermore, the court anticipated the possibility that
a parent held liable could retrieve the awarded amount if the child
plaintiff died before the parent.48 Thus, as in Mississippi and
Tennessee, the Supreme Court of Washington implemented an absolute rule of parent-child tort immunity. 49
B. Chipping Away at Mississippi'sRule: Illinois'
Treatment of Parent-ChildTort Immunity
An Illinois court recognized the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
for the first time in 1895, four years after the Mississippi Supreme
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 798. The court stated:
There seems to be some reason in this argument, but it overlooks the fact that
courts in determining their jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction, rely upon
certain uniform principles of law, and, if it be once established that a child has
a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line of demarkation which
can be drawn, for the same principle which would allow the action in the case
of a heinous crime, like the one involved in this case, would allow an action to
be brought for any other tort.
Roller, 79 P. at 788-89.
45. Id. at 789.
46. Id.
47. Id. According to the court:
[Tihe public has an interest in the financial welfare of other minor members of
the family, and it would not be the policy of the law to allow the estate, which
is to be looked to for the support of all the minor children, to be appropriated
by any particular one.
Id.
48. Roller, 79 P. at 789. The court predicted, "If a child should recover a judgment
from a parent, in the event of [the child's] death the parent would become heir to the very
property which had been wrested by the law from him." Id.
49. Id.
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Court's Hewellette decision.50 As in other jurisdictions, Illinois courts
have since carved out several exceptions to an absolute bar against tort
litigation between parents and children." This Part discusses Illinois'
initial adoption of the doctrine5 2 and describes five situations in which
Illinois courts have disallowed immunity as a defense.53
1. Foley v. Foley: Parent-Child Tort Immunity Comes to Illinois
In Foley v. Foley,54 a minor brought an action against his uncle for
permanent injuries that he sustained while living with the uncle.55
Following his father's death and his mother's remarriage, the plaintiff
resided with the uncle for fourteen years.56 The plaintiff alleged that
during that time, the uncle often beat him and failed to provide medical
attention when a horse kicked and broke the boy's arm.5 '
At trial, the court instructed the jury that a child may not maintain 5a8
civil action for damages against a parent or one acting as a parent.
On review, the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court agreed
with this instruction, stating that a child may not bring an action alleging parental maltreatment, whether the relation is by blood or created
by adoption.59 Accordingly, while the appellate court remanded the
case to determine the validity of the plaintiffs adoption, it made clear
that in at least one appellate district, some form of immunity was available to Illinois parents. 60
50. Foley v. Foley, 61 11. App. 577 (1895).
51. See infra notes 61-97; see also Robert A. Belzer, Comment, Child v. Parent:
Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 206-218 (1967).
Belzer explains how most jurisdictions have gradually strayed from applying the
parental immunity rule in its purest form. Id. Belzer also touches on the following situations in which, as of 1966, some American courts refused to afford immunity: (1)
actions alleging willful or malicious torts; (2) actions accruing after the emancipation of
the child; (3) actions against persons standing in loco parentis; (4) actions arising from
a parent's business activity; (5) third-party liability actions; (6) actions commenced
after the death of a parent or child; (7) wrongful death actions; and (8) actions covered by
liability insurance. Id.
52. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 61-97 and accompanying text.
54. 61 111. App. 577 (1895).
55. Id. at 578.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 579.
58. Id.
59. Foley, 61 111.App. at 580. Apparently, the Foley court, which introduced
parental immunity into Illinois law, believed that one standing in loco parentis should
also be immune to suits brought by the minor, unemancipated children in their custody.
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see supra note 35.
60. Foley, 61 11. App. at 580.
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2. Illinois' Exceptions to Parent-Child Tort Immunity
Illinois courts fell in line with Foley and did not modify its absolute
prohibition of parent-child tort litigation for approximately sixty
years.6 ' Then, in 1956, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the first
of five exceptions to parental immunity.
In Nudd v. Matsoukas,62 the supreme court abolished parent-child
immunity for tort claims arising from a parent's willful and wanton
conduct.6 3 Plaintiff William Matsoukas, Jr., a minor, brought an
action against his father seeking to recover for injuries he sustained in
an automobile accident. 64 The plaintiff alleged that his father acted in a
willful and wanton manner by driving too fast for conditions on a wet,
foggy night.65 Characterizing the question as a novel one in Illinois,
the court held that the public policy reasons behind the doctrine of
parent-child immunity did not justify barring a suit based on willful
and wanton misconduct. 66 Therefore, the court ruled the complaint
6 1. In 1933, the Third District of the Illinois Appellate Court echoed the doctrine
recognized in Foley. Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933). The
Meece court asserted, "It is a rule of common law based upon public policy that a minor
child cannot sue his father in tort unless a right of action is authorized by statute." Id. at
169; see also Grobart, supra note 1, at 313. Grobart stated:
Illinois was among the first states to recognize the doctrine that an unemancipated minor child cannot maintain an action against a parent for damages
resulting from maltreatment. This absolute prohibition against parent-child
tort litigation remained the law in Illinois until 1956, when the gradual
erosion of parental immunity began.
Id.
62. 131 N.E.2d 525 (II1. 1956).
63. Id. at 531. As it created an exception to the doctrine of parent-child immunity,
the Nudd court acknowledged that "[t]he logic of the Hewellette decision has been
convincingly attacked" and that "the authorities are in hopeless conflict." Id. at 530.
64. Id. at 526.
65. Id.
66. Nudd, 131 N.E.2d at 531. The court stated:
Any justification for the rule of parental immunity can be found only in a
reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit.
While this policy might be such justification to prevent suits for mere negligence within the scope of the parental relationship we do not conceive that
public policy should prevent a minor from obtaining redress for willful and
wanton misconduct on the part of a parent.
Id.
Willful and wanton misconduct is defined as: "Conduct which is committed with an
intentional or reckless disregard for the safety of others or with an intentional disregard
of a duty necessary to the safety of another's property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1600
(6th ed. 1990); see also Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 395 N.E.2d 538, 541 (I11.
1979) (requiring willful and wanton conduct in the course of supervisory authority in
order to impose tort liability on teachers and coaches); Tanari v. School Directors, 373
N.E.2d 5, 8 (Il1. 1977) (requiring proof of willful and wanton misconduct by an educator,
as guardian of students, in order to impose liability for injury to a student); Kobylanski
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stated an actionable claim.67 According to the court, tolerating reckless
conduct like that of the Nudd father would not foster family unity.68
Furthermore, dismissing the plaintiff's action would deny him just
compensation without fostering any compensating societal benefit.69
In Schenk v. Schenk,70 an Illinois Appellate Court also found occasion to disregard the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity. 71 Unlike
most cases invoking the doctrine, in Schenk, a parent was the plaintiff.
Theodore Schenk sued his unemancipated daughter for injuries that he
sustained when she negligently struck him with an automobile.72 To
counter his daughter's immunity defense, the plaintiff argued that the
daughter's alleged negligence fell outside the scope of any family
purpose.73 The court accepted this argument and concluded that
neither party had acted in furtherance of duties owed to each other as
father and daughter.74 Accordingly, since the relationship between the
parties would have been the sole reason for dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint, the court refused to apply the doctrine of parent-child tort
immunity. Instead, the court remanded with instructions that liability
could arise from actions constituting a breach of duty outside the
family relationship.76
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705, 710 (Ill.
1976) (refusing to waive tort immunity in absence of proof of willful and wanton misconduct).
67. Nudd, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
68. Id.
69. Id. The court's exact words were: "To tolerate such misconduct and deprive a child
of relief will not foster family unity but will deprive a person of redress, without any
corresponding social benefit, for an injury long recognized at common law." Id.
70. 241 N.E.2d 12 (I11.
App. Ct. 1968).
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 12. Schenk is one of the more unusual cases in which a parent sues his
unemancipated child. In its most comprehensive form, however, the doctrine of parentchild immunity protects children from actions by their parents and parents from actions
by their children. See supra note 1.
73. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d at 13.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id. In Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Turner, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (111.
App. Ct.
1980), the court considered the family purpose exception advanced by the plaintiff in
Schenk and held that a plaintiff invoking this exception must allege facts in the
complaint which indicate that the defendant's actions fall outside the family purpose.
Id. at 1259. The Turner court gave the following rationale:
We believe it is the duty of the plaintiff to include in the complaint an affirmative allegation supported by specific facts that the injury arose as the result of
negligence in connection with an activity outside the family relationship.
Failure to make such an allegation will render the complaint insufficient at law
and subject to a motion to dismiss on the basis of the parental tort immunity
rule.
Id.
76. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
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The Schenk court touched on a third situation in which the family
relationship does not warrant a grant of immunity." Illinois courts
will not apply the parental immunity doctrine when the defendant in an
intrafamilial suit breaches a duty owed to the general public. For
example, in Cummings v. Jackson,78 the plaintiffs mother violated a
city ordinance by failing to trim the trees outside her home.79 Plaintiff
Laura Cummings, a minor, alleged that the untrimmed trees obstructed
the view of a driver who struck and injured her.80 As in Schenk, the
Cummings court reasoned that the family relationship did not give rise
to the duty owed by the defendant. 8' The court thus refused to extend
parental immunity to the defendant, because by violating the city ordinance, the defendant breached a duty that she owed to the general
public.82
A fourth exception to parent-child tort immunity arises if the tortfeasor's death dissolves the family relationship. For example, in Johnson
v. Myers,83 the minor plaintiffs alleged that their father, who had since
died, negligently injured them as they rode as passengers in his car.84
The plaintiffs argued that the death of their father had severed the
family relationship protected by tort immunity. 85 Accepting this argument, the court refused to accept the traditional premise of preserving
family harmony as a basis for extending immunity to the estate of the
deceased father.86
Finally, Larson v. Buschkamp 87 illustrates the fifth exception to the
doctrine of parent-child immunity recognized in Illinois. In Larson,
the Illinois Appellate Court allowed a defendant to file a contribution
77. Id. at 12. The court stated, "The duty breached by the defendant in the operation
of the automobile was the same duty owed by her to all pedestrians lawfully using the
public street." Id. at 12-13.
78. 372 N.E.2d 1127 (111.
App. Ct. 1978).
79. Id. at 1128.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 277 N.E.2d 778 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1972).
84. Id. at 778.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 779. But see Marsh v. McNeill, 483 N.E.2d 595 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985). In
Marsh, the court held that a minor defendant in an automobile negligence case was
immune from a cause of action brought by her injured sister and the executor of her
parents' estate. Id. at 600. The court distinguished Johnson by explaining that in
Marsh, one of the plaintiffs and the defendant were still alive. Id. at 599. The court
reasoned that a lawsuit brought by a living sibling and the executor of her parents' estate
could still disrupt family harmony. Id. Therefore, despite the Johnson exception, the
parent-child immunity doctrine protected the child defendant in Marsh. Id. at 600.
87. 435 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
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action against an injured child's parents.8 8 The Larson court determined that neither the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity nor the
Illinois contribution statute 89 provides a substantive bar to third parties
seeking contribution from a negligent parent." The court concluded
that such an action poses no danger to the relationship between an
injured child and a contributing parent. 9' The court further reasoned
that allowing contribution in this context is consistent with the policy
of apportioning damages among all liable parties. 92 Finding no
compelling public policy reasons to prohibit contribution against a
parent who injures a child, the Larson court formulated yet another
exception to Illinois' parental immunity doctrine.
In sum, Illinois courts have carved out five exceptions to parentchild tort immunity. Parental immunity has failed as a defense in the
following intrafamilial lawsuits: (1) actions arising from willful and
wanton conduct; 93 (2) actions involving conduct by the tortfeasor that
is outside the family purpose; 94 (3) actions alleging the breach of a

duty owed to the general public; 95 (4) actions where death has
dissolved the family relationship; 96 and.(5) third-party contribution
actions against a negligent parent. 97

88. Id. at 226. Several other courts have followed the Larson court's lead in allowing
third-party contribution actions against negligent parents under Illinois law. See
Aimone v. Walgreens Co., 601 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Hartigan v. Beery, 470
N.E.2d 571 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984); Moon v. Thompson, 469 N.E.2d 365 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1984).
89. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 740, § 100/2 (West 1992) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70,
302(a) (1979)). This statute states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are subject
to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the
same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even
though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them.
Id. § 100/2(a).
90. Larson, 435 N.E.2d at 224.
91. Id. at 225.
92. Id.
93. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (!11.
1956); see supra notes 62-69 and
accompanying text.
94. Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); see supra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text.
95. Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); see supra notes 7882 and accompanying text.
96. Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778 (111.
App. Ct. 1972); see supra notes 83-86
and accompanying text.
97. Larson v. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221 (III. App. Ct. 1982); see supra notes 8792 and accompanying text.

6-18

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 25

C. The Latest Trilogy: Three Modem Approaches
To Litigation Between Parentsand Children
Most jurisdictions have attempted to establish fair and predictable
standards for the use of the parent-child immunity doctrine. 9 While
Illinois has carved out specific exceptions to the doctrine, other states
have sought more flexible standards to apply in all tort actions between
parents and children. This Part outlines the standards developed in
Wisconsin, California, and New York, three jurisdictions that have
taken groundbreaking steps in modem parent-child tort litigation. 99
1. Wisconsin's Approach: Where Exceptions Become the Rule
In 1963, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin abolished the absolute
rule of parent-child tort immunity in Goller v. White.'0° Daniel Goller,
a minor, alleged that he suffered severe injury to his right leg as a
result of his foster parent's negligent operation of a farm tractor.' 0 '
The defendant argued that he was entitled to parent-child tort immunity
because he stood in loco parentis to the plaintiff.'
Although the trial court agreed with this argument, 0 3 the supreme
court's reasoning led to a substantially different conclusion.' °4 The
supreme court observed that since the emergence of parent-child tort
immunity, jurisdictions throughout the country had established several
exceptions to the doctrine.0 5 The court also noted that family
harmony is often already disturbed before a child plaintiff even files a
suit.0 6 Moreover, the court reasoned that the presence of liability
insurance often lessens any disruption of family harmony caused by
suits between parents and children.'0 7 Therefore, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin decided to set aside parent-child immunity except in two

98. See Belzer, supra note 51, at 61-92.
99. See infra notes 100-136 and accompanying text.
100. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
101. Id. at 193-94.
102. Id. at 194.
103. See id. at 196.
104. Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198. In Goller, the Wisconsin Supreme Court could have
merely refused to afford immunity to one standing in loco parentis. Instead, the supreme
court took the opportunity to abrogate virtually the entire doctrine. Id.
105. Id. at 197. According to the Goller court: "The courts' hostility to the parentalimmunity rule in negligence cases is shown by the exceptions which have been carved
out of it." Id.
106. Id. This is the same argument that was rejected by the Supreme Court of
Washington years before in Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 788-89 (Wash. 1905); see supra
notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
107. Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 197.
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situations.'0 8 The court held that it would recognize tort litigation
between parents and children except "(1) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other care."'' 9 Accordingly,
the court reversed and remanded, directing Wisconsin courts to apply
this standard in intrafamilial tort litigation."'
2. California's Approach: The Reasonable Parent Standard
Eight years after Goller, the Supreme Court of California also
refused to recognize absolute parental immunity. In Gibson v.
Gibson,"' California's highest court traced the origin, development,
and modification of parent-child tort immunity in America.'" 2 As had
the Wisconsin court, the California Supreme Court concluded that the
reasons for implementing parental immunity failed to justify its retention." 13 The court explained that uncompensated injuries may cause as
much family strife as an attempt to seek compensation." 4 The court
also anticipated no more danger of collusion in suits between parents
and minor children than it did in actions between husbands and wives,
brothers and sisters, and adult children and parents, all of which
California courts permitted at the time." 5
Although the California Supreme Court agreed with most of the
108. Id. at 198.
109. Id.
110. Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198. Applying its new standard, the court held that the
plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of action and remanded with directions for the trial
court to determine whether the conduct alleged in the complaint fell within the two
exceptions where Wisconsin would now afford immunity. Id.
I 11. 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971). In Gibson, the California Supreme Court re-examined its holding in Trudell v. Leatherby, 300 P. 7 (Cal. 1931), in which it had held that
an unemancipated, minor child could not bring a negligence action against a parent. Id.
112. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 649-52.
113. Id. at 648. The Gibson court expressed strong disdain for the immunity rule and
its justifications. Alluding to the preservation of family harmony, the court stated, "If
this rationale ever had any validity, it has none today." Id. The court further reasoned
that "parental immunity has become a legal anachronism, riddled with exceptions and
seriously undermined by recent decisions of this court. Lacking the support of authority
and reason, the rule must fall." Id.
114. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 651. Like the Wisconsin court, the California court also
took into account the effect liability insurance may have on minimizing "family strife."
Id. The court observed that intrafamilial suits are normally brought only where there is
insurance, in which case there are no threats to family harmony. Id. at 653 (quoting
Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (1948)).
115. Id. at 651-52.
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Goller court's reasons for abrogating the doctrine, the California court
developed a different approach towards recognizing parent-child suits.
The Gibson court suggested that like absolute immunity itself, the
Wisconsin rule might go too far in protecting parents who treat their
children negligently. 116 The court predicted that a parent who successfully brought her conduct within the broad exceptions of Goller could
justify acting "negligently with impunity.""' 7 The Gibson court also
believed that the Wisconsin test would require courts to draw arbitrary
distinctions regarding the scope of parental authority and discretion in
order to determine
whether immunity should be afforded to a particular
8
defendant."
Accordingly, the Gibson court sought a test that would ensure that
parents did not abuse the authority they have over their children.' ' 9
The court explained that the proper question to ask in parent-child
litigation is: "[W]hat would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
parenthave done in similar circumstances?"' 20 Therefore, the Gibson
court effectively abolished the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity in
California by adopting an objective "reasonable parent"
standard in
2
litigation between minor children and their parents.' '
3. New York's Approach: No Action for Negligent Supervision
In 1974, the New York Court of Appeals also reevaluated its
approach towards actions between parents and children in Holodook
v. Spencer. 22 In a consolidation of three cases, the Holodook court
116. Id. at 652-53. Referring to Wisconsin's approach, the court stated: "[W]e reject
the implication of Goller that within certain aspects of the parent-child relationship, the
parent has carte blanche to act negligently toward his child." Id. at 652-53.
117. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 653.
1 20. Id. In light of this new standard, the court ruled that the plaintiffs complaint
stated a cause of action. Id. at 654. Thus, upon remand, a jury would have to determine
whether instructing a minor to exit a car onto a busy roadway constitutes action of a
reasonable parent.
121. Id. at 653. The Gibson decision has received both praise and criticism by those
analyzing the "reasonable parent" standard. See Carolyn L. Andrews, Comment, ParentChild Torts in Texas and the Reasonable Prudent ParentStandard, 40 BAYLOR L. REV.
113, 125 (1988) (arguing that the Gibson standard "properly leaves to the jury the task
of distinguishing between the reasonable exercise of parental discretion and an unreasonable disregard of parental duty"); see also Grobart, supra note I, at 327 (urging the
state of Illinois to adopt a reasonable parent standard). But see Rooney, supra note 22,
at 1174-75 (calling the Gibson court's solution a "false standard" because applying a
"reasonable parent" standard is no different from applying a "reasonable person"
standard).
122. 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974).
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inquired whether it should hold parents liable for failing to supervise
their children adequately. 23 The court sought to resolve this question
by determining the scope of GeIbman v. Gelbman,'24 New York's
most significant decision on parent-child tort immunity.' 25
In Gelbman, the court of appeals had previously held that it would
recognize an action between a parent and child where, absent a family
relationship, the court would otherwise recognize a negligence
action. 26 In other words, the Holodook court reasoned that GeIbman
did not create any new intrafamilial duties or liabilities. 27 The
Holodook court interpreted GeIbman as merely abolishing a defense
prevented recovery for nonwillful torts between
that had previously
128
family members.

The Holodook court effectively narrowed the potentially broad
impact of Gelbman, ultimately refusing to hold that the abolishment of
immunity in Geibman opened the door to a new tort action for
parental
negligent supervision. 2 ' First, the Court drew a distinction between
duties ordinarily owed absent any family relationship and duties owed
as part of a family relationship. 30 The court explained that where an
ordinary duty is breached, sanctions will not be withheld merely
because of a parent-child relationship.' 3' According to the Holodook
court, this follows directly from Gelbman. 32 However, where a case
123. Id. at 339. The Holodook court consolidated Graney v. Graney, Ryan v. Fahey,
and Holodook v. Spencer. Id. at 340-41. In Graney, an infant plaintiff brought an
action for negligent supervision against his father for injuries sustained after falling
from a playground slide. Id. at 340. In Ryan, a three-year-old plaintiff who had been
run over by a lawn mower operated by another child brought an action against his
mother for negligent supervision. Id. at 340-41. Finally, in the third case before the
court, the Holodook infant brought an action against the driver of an automobile that
struck the plaintiff. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 341. The defendant then filed a thirdparty contribution action against the plaintiff's mother for negligent supervision. Id.
From these three cases, the Holodook court extracted the common issue of whether New
York recognizes an actionable tort for negligent parental supervision. Id. at 340.
124. 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969).
125. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 340.
126. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at 194.
127. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 340 (discussing Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192).
128. Id at 342. The Holodook court observed that "[i]n abolishing the immunity
defense, Geibman allows suits between parents and children which would previously
have been actionable between the parties absent the family relationship." Id.
129. Id. at 346.
130. Id.
13 1. Id. In the court's words: "Of course, where the duty is ordinarily owed, apart
from the family relation, the law will not withhold its sanctions merely because the
parties are parent and child." Id. Thus, New York law would recognize a cause of action
against a parent who negligently injured his child in an automobile accident.
132. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346 (interpreting Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192).
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involves a parent's duty to protect his child from injury-a duty that
arises from and goes to the "very heart" of the family relationship"Geibman did not pave the way for the law's superintendence of this
duty."' 133 Thus, because it involves alleging the breach of a parent's
duty to protect his child, the Holodook court
refused to recognize a
34
cause of action for negligent supervision.
In sum, New York generally allows negligence actions brought by
minor children against their parents. Nevertheless, like the high courts
of Wisconsin and California, the New York Court of Appeals wanted
to avoid infringing upon parental authority and discretion in supervising children. 35 Thus, while it reiterated the Gelbman holding that
parental immunity fails as a defense when a duty is owed apart from
the family relationship, the Holodook court also ruled that a minor
plaintiff cannot maintain an action for negligent supervision against his
own parents.' 36
133. Id.
134. Furthermore, a counterclaim or third-party crossclaim against a contributorily
negligent parent would fail because, under Holodook, parents are absolved from liability
for failing to adequately supervise their own children. Id. As a result, a contributorily
negligent third-party would have to compensate fully for the injuries of a child. Id. at
348 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 346. In expressing its concern with infringing upon parental authority
and discretion, the Holodook court criticized the "reasonable parent" standard used by
California. According to Holodook, California's approach tends to "circumscribe the
wide range of discretion a parent ought to have in permitting his child to undertake
responsibility and gain independence." Id.
136. Id. Curiously, while parents in New York cannot be held liable for injuries
sustained by their own child, they may be held liable for any injuries their child inflicts
on a third-party while under the parent's careless supervision. Id. at 343. According to
the Holodook court, New York precedent supports this result. The court explained:
The law has in the past interjected itself into the family relation to the limited
extent of assuring support and guidance personally to the child and of providing a remedy in limited circumstances to third persons who are injured by a
negligently supervised child. Beyond this, in New York the law has not
ventured into the realm of duties owed by parents to their own children.
Id. at 343.
The court also found support for this position in a review of legislative action in this
area. While admitting that New York's legislature had intervened in family relationships only to a limited degree, the court stated:
When we consult the body of statutory law regarding parents' specified duties
to their children, we do not find a premise which leads us, by analogy or
reasonable inference, to a conclusion that the legislative judgment on this
subject would favor recognition of child's suit against his parent for negligent
supervision.
Id. at 345.
Finally, the court justified its ruling by considering the potential for abusing a negligent supervision claim. For example, the court predicted that such actions would be
"brought in retaliatory contexts between estranged parents, one suing the other on the
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DISCUSSION

The highest courts in Wisconsin, California, and New York have
each taken substantially different routes in limiting or abolishing the
rule of absolute parent-child tort immunity. In Cates v. Cates, 37 the
Supreme Court of Illinois took its turn at reevaluating the doctrine of
parent-child tort immunity. 38 In response to growing confusion over
when to apply parent-child tort immunity or when to invoke one of its
exceptions, the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in
Cates.3 9

A. Cates v. Cates: The Facts and Lower Court Opinions.
On June 9, 1985, four-year-old Heather Cates rode as a passenger
in an automobile owned and operated by her father, Timothy Cates,
who was exercising his visitation privileges as Heather's noncustodial
parent.1 40 As Timothy's car approached an intersection of two state
highways, it collided with another automobile. 41 The driver of the
other vehicle died in the collision, and Heather sustained serious
injuries.' 42
Heather sought compensation for her injuries by filing a negligence
action through her mother and next friend, Nancy Cates
Schmittling 43 Named as defendants were Timothy Cates, the other
driver's estate, and a company that had been performing road
construction near the crash site.'
Timothy moved for summary judgment, claiming that parent-child
tort immunity barred Heather's claim and any derivative actions against

child's behalf, or by children estranged by their parents who could sue after reaching
majority." Id.
New York's approach has not escaped criticism. According to one author: "The failure
to recognize a parental duty to supervise is unjustifiable. It is paradoxical to hold that
other relationships involve a duty to properly supervise a child, but that a parent does
not owe such a duty to his own child." Grobart, supra note 1,at 320 (footnotes omitted).
137. 619 N.E.2d 715 (I11.
1993).
138. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Illinois almost decided the same issue it faced in
Cates, in Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (I11.
1988). Stallman came before
both the circuit court and the appellate court twice before reaching the supreme court. By
deciding the case on other grounds, however, the supreme court never reached the parentchild immunity issue.
139. 602 N.E.2d 448 (111.
1992).
140. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 716.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.

624

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 25

him.'45 The trial court granted Timothy summary judgment on both
Heather's claim and on a claim for subrogation filed by her mother's
insurer. 4 6 The trial court questioned whether granting immunity
under these circumstances was consistent with the doctrine's
purpose.'47 Nevertheless, the court felt compelled by precedent to rule
for Timothy.' 48
The appellate court refused to affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment based on parental immunity.' 49 In so doing, the
appellate court recommended the abolishment of parent-child tort
immunity in Illinois.' 50 Nevertheless, the court refrained from taking
that drastic measure.' 5' Instead, it developed a rule more specifically
related to the facts in Cates. 52 In what essentially became a sixth
exception to parental immunity in Illinois, the appellate court abandoned the doctrine for automobile negligence actions between parents
and their children. 53
B. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
The supreme court granted leave to appeal in Cates'5 4 to determine
145. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 716.
146. Id.
147. Id. The supreme court quoted the trial court as stating: "[I]t is difficult ..
to
determine that the purpose of the parental immunity doctrine would be served by applying it to the facts of this case." Id.
148. Id.
149. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330, 335 (I1. App. Ct. 1992).
150. Id. The court stated: "Having examined the doctrine of parental immunity's
history, its rationale and its treatment by our supreme court and the courts in other jurisdictions, we believe it should be abolished." Id.
151. Id. The court explained:
We ... are acutely aware that it is the supreme court, not us, who is the ultimate policy arm of the judicial branch and who bears the responsibility of
unifying the law throughout this State. Since we cannot predict with certainty
all sets of facts that are possible within the field of parental immunity, we
cannot predict the impact of a rule of universal applicability.
Id. at 335.
152. Id.
153. Id. The appellate court ultimately held that "a parent is not immune from suit
brought by a child alleging personal injury proximately caused by that parent's negligent operation of an automobile." Id.
This approach has been adopted by several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Unah v.
Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Williams
v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976);
Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971). The main justification for this exception is that most defendants will be covered by insurance policies. See Cates, 588
N.E.2d at 335. For a discussion of eliminating immunity in automobile accident cases,
see Grobart, supra note 1, at 322-23.
154. 602 N.E.2d 448 (1992).
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whether the appellate court properly reversed the summary judgment
for the defendant.' 55 The Cates court acknowledged that the parties
had raised two issues: (1) whether the supreme court had ever adopted
parent-child tort immunity; and (2) whether that doctrine barred
Heather's action against her father, Timothy, for negligent operation of
an automobile.' s6
The supreme court addressed the first issue by evaluating the precedential effect of previous cases that refer to the parent-child immunity
doctrine. 57 The court observed that although an Illinois appellate
court had acknowledged parental immunity in 1895,158 the supreme
court did not modify the doctrine until sixty-one years later in Nudd.5609
The parties in Cates cited Nudd for very different propositions.
Timothy argued that in Nudd, the supreme court had recognized the
doctrine of parental immunity in matters of mere negligence. 6' On the
other 62hand, Heather argued that Nudd had no such effect on Illinois
law.

The Cates court concluded that Nudd acknowledged the doctrine of
parent-child tort immunity in negligence actions.163 Further, the court
noted that no supreme court decision explicitly held that the doctrine
bars all negligence actions between parents and children; yet the court
viewed the references to the doctrine in Nudd and other cases as
recognizing parent-child immunity in Illinois law."6
155. Cares, 619 N.E.2d at 716. Writing for the majority, Justice Freeman first laid
out the standard of review for the court. Id. No genuine issue as to any material fact
existed in Cates. Id. Therefore, the court's sole function was to determine whether
judgment for the defendant was proper as a matter of law. Id.
156. Id. at 716.
157. Cates; 619 N.E.2d at 718-20.
158. Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 577, 580 (1895).
159. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. The Cates court observed that
after Nudd, the doctrine of parent-child immunity did not bar a child's suit for willful and
wanton conduct. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 718.
160. Cares, 619 N.E.2d at 718.
161. Id. at 717-18.
162. Id. Heather Cates argued that the holding in Nudd applied only to actions
involving intentional torts. According to the plaintiff, "Nudd did not hold that the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine barred negligence actions because the court did not
decide that issue." Id. at 718.
163. Id. at 719.
164. Id. at 719-720. The court stated:
Although Nudd decided the question of parent-child tort immunity in the area of
intentional torts, judicial dictum recognized the doctrine's existence in the
area of negligence and that recognition carried the full force of a judicial
determination. The recognition of parent-child tort immunity doctrine is
further apparent by its reference in subsequent decisions of this court.
Through frequent repetition and approval, the rule has become established.
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This brought the Cates court to its second issue: whether the
doctrine of parent-child tort immunity barred Heather's action based on
her father's alleged negligence. 65 Even though the court's inquiry
focused upon cases involving negligence in automobile accidents, the
court acknowledged that the law has made no fundamental distinction
between automobile and other negligence actions. 66 Therefore, the
in Cates would affect the entire area
court anticipated that its decision
67
1
negligence.
of parent-child
Mindful of this, the court reevaluated the utility of retaining parentchild tort immunity in Illinois. First, the court traced the origin, development, and modification of parental immunity in America. 168 The
court also reviewed the traditional public policy reasons for the
doctrine 69 and discussed the approaches taken in many jurisdictions
that have fully abrogated parental immunity. 70 The court then
narrowed its discussion to Illinois law and the five exceptions to
Id. at 719 (citations omitted).
The Cates court cited other cases that discussed the doctrine of parent-child immunity:
Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390 (Ill. 1983) (citing Thomas and recognizing the rule prohibiting suits by children against parents for negligence), cert. denied,
Raja v. Michael Reese Hospital, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ.,
395 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ill. 1979) (citing Mroczynski and Nudd for the rule that children
may not maintain negligence actions against parents); Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d
1323, 1324 (111. 1978) (relying on Nudd, Mroczynski, and Kobylanski, the court stated
that Illinois generally does not allow children to sue their parents for mere negligence);
Tanari v. School Directors, 373 N.E.2d 5, 9 (I11.1977) (citing Nudd, the court stated that
"a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent willful and wanton misconduct");
Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705 (I11.1976) (relying on Nudd and
Mroczynski to hold that the parental immunity doctrine extended to teachers standing in
loco parentis); Mroczynski v. McGrath, 216 N.E.2d 137, 139 (111. 1966) (stating that
the Nudd court had reviewed parental immunity).
165. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 720.
166. Id.
167. Id. ("Although the facts of this appeal concern automobile negligence and
plaintiff characterizes the issue as whether the immunity applies to automobile negligence cases, we understand that the entire area of parent-child negligence is necessarily
implicated.").
168. Id. at 721-22.
169. Id. at 721. According to the Cates court, public policy reasons justifying
parental immunity include the preserving of family harmony and parental authority as
well as preventing the depletion of parental estates to the detriment of other children.
Cares, 619 N.E.2d at 721.
170. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 722. The court explained that most jurisdictions have
either fully abrogated the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity or have partially abrogated the doctrine by carving out exceptions to the general rule of parental immunity.
Id.
The court also engaged in a brief discussion of the approaches taken in Wisconsin,
California, and New York. Id. For a review of the standards used in these jurisdictions,
see supra notes 100-136 and accompanying text.
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immunity previously recognized by Illinois courts.' '
Of the five exceptions, the Cates court focused primarily on the
family purpose exception.7 7 The court explained that this exception
has caused some confusion in automobile negligence cases. 173 The
court observed that while some appellate cases interpreted Schenkthe seminal case on the family purpose exception-as holding that the
act of driving in an automobile falls outside any family purpose, many
other courts had based their decisions on the existence of a family
purpose on the family's reasons for driving the car. 7 4 In those cases,
the court noted, the availability of immunity depended mainly on the
destination of the vehicle and other factual considerations unique to
each case.175 While this confusion troubled the Cates court, the court
expressed approval of both the family purpose exception and the dutyto-the-general-public exception. 76 The court added that these exceptions take into account
that tort litigation does not always disrupt
177

family harmony.

Accordingly, the Cates court based its new standard on the rationale
but not the exact language of Schenk. 178 It explained that a court
should not focus on the factual "purpose" or "objective" for driving a
car. 171 Instead, the Cates court instructed, courts should inquire
171. Id. at 722-26; see supra notes 61-97 and accompanying text.
172. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 723-25. See supra notes 70-76, 94 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the family purpose exception.
173. Id. at 725.
174. Id. The Cates court explained, "Unfortunately, many Illinois appellate decisions after Schenk looked to its expansive 'family purpose' language and not to the
underlying rationale." Id. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and holding in Schenk.
175. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 725. The court discussed cases where children were not
allowed to sue their parents for negligence because the families were driving to the
App. Ct. 1980), or to
child's prospective college, Eisele v. Tenuta, 404 N.E.2d 349 (I11.
App. Ct. 1982).
the child's piano lessons, Hogan v. Hogan, 435 N.E.2d 770 (I11.
176. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 726 ("We have considered the reasoning of Schenk as well
as Cummings and approve of those exceptions.").
177. Id. This is especially relevant in the Cates case in light of the fact that Heather
Cates argued that protecting family harmony in her case was futile because her parents
were already divorced. Id. at 720. The Cates court seemed to agree, stating:
In truth, the traditional policy of family harmony is no longer viable, as
Schenk recognized. The focus has shifted to a concern with preventing litigation concerning conduct intimately associated with the parent-child relationship. The exceptions consistently demonstrate that where the family
relationship is dissolved or where that relationship has ceased to exist with
respect to conduct giving rise to the injury, the immunity will not be applied.
Id. at 726.
178. Id. at 728-29.
179. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 728 ("We wish to clarify the Schenk exception so that the
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whether the alleged conduct uniquely relates to the parent-child
relationship.' 80 According to the court, the appropriate inquiry in
Cates would be "whether the alleged conduct concerns parental discretion in discipline, supervision, and care of the child."' 8'1 If so, a court
should not involve itself in the family's situation, and should thus
apply the immunity doctrine.8 2
The court noted a similarity between its new standard and the
standard used in Wisconsin. 3 The Cates court explained that its new
standard approximates the Wisconsin standard "without its enumerated
duties."' 84 Thus, the Cates court announced, in Illinois a court should
recognize parental immunity only for suits that arise out of conduct
uniquely inherent to the parent-child relationship. Despite this
holding, the court declined to lay out the precise boundaries of this
conduct.' 85
Applying this standard to the facts of Cates, the court concluded that
the negligent operation of an automobile is not inherent to the parentchild relationship.' 86 The court reasoned that such conduct does not
represent the decision-making process or discretion of a parent in
disciplining, supervising, or caring for his or her child. 87 Even
though Timothy had driven the car while exercising his visitation
rights as a parent, the court determined that his duties as a driver did
not inherently relate to the parent-child relationship. 88 Instead, the
court held Timothy Cates owed a duty to his daughter as a member of
the general public. 89 Therefore, the court affirmed the appellate
court's ruling allowing Heather's negligence action against her
father.' 90
C. Chief JusticeMiller's Dissenting Opinion
Calling for legislative action, Chief Justice Miller was the lone
'purpose' and 'objective' are not paramount.").
180. Id. at 729.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The Wisconsin approach to parent-child immunity is set forth in Goller v.
White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963), discussed supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
184. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.
190. Id. at 730.
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dissenter in Cates v. Cates.'9' The Chief Justice agreed with the
majority that Illinois had previously adopted the doctrine of parentchild tort immunity. 92 Furthermore, since the doctrine was judicially
did not doubt the supreme court's power
created, Chief Justice Miller
93
it.'
eliminate
or
to modify
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Miller's dissent questioned the court's
wisdom in modifying the doctrine. 94 According to the Chief Justice,
deciding the proper scope of immunity afforded to parents is fundamentally a question of public policy. 95 Therefore, Chief Justice Miller
that legislative action could better resolve the issues before the
believed
96
1
court.
Chief Justice Miller also expressed concern with the potential effects
of the court's decision in Cates.'9' He predicted that any change in the
area of parental immunity would implicate a variety of important interests.' 98 For instance, he observed that the court's decision would
primarily affect the traditional authority of parents over their minor
children.' 99 He urged, however, that modifying the doctrine could
also affect other parties such as insurance providers 2 ° and teachers
standing in loco parentis.20 '
Thus, although he conceded the court's power to modify the
doctrine, Chief Justice Miller questioned the prudence of the court's
decision.2 °2 In sum, he concluded that the legislative process could
191. 619 N.E.2d at 730-32 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 731 (Miller, C.J., dissenting) ("As the majority explains, although this
court has not specifically held that the rule of immunity governs negligence actions
between parent and child, the court has consistently approved that doctrine through
judicial dicta." (citing Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (III. 1978); Mroczynski v.
McGrath, 216 N.E.2d 137 (I11.1966); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956))).
193. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 731 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Miller, C., dissenting) ("Prudence, and not power, should guide our action
here.").
195. Id. at 731-32 (Miller, C., dissenting).
196. Id. at 731 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
198. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 731 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
200. Chief Justice Miller predicted that a modification of the doctrine would
"substantially affect existing underwriting standards and measurements of risk." Id.
(Miller, C.J., dissenting).
201. The Chief Justice expressed concern that modifying Illinois' parental immunity
doctrine might necessitate changing the statutory provisions that extend immunity to
Illinois teachers. Id. (Miller, C.J., dissenting) (referring to ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 105, §
5/24-24, 5/34-84(a) (West 1992) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, 91 24-24, 34-84(a)
(1991))).
202. Id. at 732 (Miller, C.J., dissenting) ("I do not doubt our power to modify the
immunity doctrine, but I must question the wisdom of our doing so.").
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better anticipate and resolve the variety of issues arising under Illinois'
parent-child immunity doctrine. 3
IV. ANALYSIS
The Cates majority recognized that Illinois affords parental immunity as a general rule, but also acknowledged several exceptions to the
doctrine. 2°4 Nevertheless, the court then developed a standard similar
to that used by Wisconsin, a state that has almost completely abrogated
the doctrine of absolute immunity. 205 Apparently, the Cates court
sought some type of balance between these two approaches. This Part
explains how, in Cates, the supreme court reached a problematic
compromise between past Illinois decisions and Wisconsin's current
approach.
A. The Cates Standard: An Attempted Compromise

Initially, the Cates court seemed compelled to retain parent-child tort
immunity as part of Illinois law. 206 To the court, each exception to
parental immunity served as another confirmation that the doctrine still
remained the general rule in Illinois. 2°7
Nevertheless, the status quo also concerned the Cates court. The
court complained about the uncertainty generated by Illinois' growing
number of exceptions to parental immunity.20 8 Indeed, the court
acknowledged that Illinois' current approach often leads to inconsistent
and arbitrary rulings. 209 Thus, while remaining loyal to precedent, 10
203. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 732 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 722. The court explained, "Illinois stands in that group of jurisdictions, a
minority, which have partially abrogated the doctrine by carving out exceptions to it."
Id.
205. Id. at 729. The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to afford immunity "except (1)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child;
and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services, and other care." Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963); see supra
notes 100- 110 and accompanying text.
The Cates court acknowledged the similarity between its new standard and the Goller
standard. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729. The court explained, 'The standard we have thus
developed focuses primarily on conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship, which
conduct. we describe by approximating the Goller standard without its enumerated
duties." Id. (citing Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198).
206. See Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 719-20.
207. Id. at 723-25.
208. Id. at 722-23.
209. Id. at 722-23. The court stated: "The approach taken by Illinois ... is considered problematic, as the law which develops is often inconsistent and arbitrary." Id. The
Cates court acknowledged the criticism of the dissenting justice in Cummings v.
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the Cates court also hoped to establish a more predictable standard to
apply in parent-child tort litigation.2 '
In essence, the Cates court attempted to achieve a compromise.
While expanding on two previously recognized exceptions to parental
immunity,2 2 the court developed a rule mirroring Wisconsin's more
clear and predictable standard.' 3 The court ultimately held that Illinois
courts would grant parental immunity where a plaintiffs allegations
arise out of conduct uniquely inherent to the parent-child relationship.23 4
B. FundamentalProblems with the Cates Compromise
At first glance, it may appear that the Cates court struck a sound
compromise. A closer examination, however, reveals that Cates may
not have given Illinois the best of both worlds. In fact, the supreme
court's attempted compromise may create as many problems as it
solves.
These problems originate in the conflicting philosophies underlying
the treatment of parental immunity in Illinois and Wisconsin. As a
general rule, Wisconsin does not recognize the absolute parent-child
immunity doctrine.1 5 Indeed, the Goller standard encompasses
Wisconsin's only two exceptions to this general rule.21 6 In contrast,
Illinois does recognize parental immunity as a general rule.23 7
Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (I1. App. Ct. 1978) (Webber, J., dissenting). In his dissent,
Justice Webber stated: "Either the doctrine of parental immunity should be abolished
altogether or left standing intact. The piecemeal approach . . . can lead to nothing but
confusion." Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 723.
210. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 720 ("[W]hile this court has not rendered a decision
holding that the parent-child tort immunity doctrines [sic] bars negligence actions, its
recognition of the doctrine in this area of the common law and subsequent confirmations
of that recognition have precedential effect.").
211. Id. at 728-29.
212. The exceptions that the supreme court expanded were the family purpose exception and the duty-to-the-general-public exception. The Schenk court had carved out the
family purpose exception for conduct falling outside the family relationship. Schenk,
241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). Relying on Schenk, the court in Cummings
held that it would not afford immunity if the duty breached was one owed to the general
public and not specifically to the child. Cummings, 372 N.E.2d at 1128. The supreme
court expressed its approval of both of these exceptions. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 726.
213. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 728-29. Without actually calling its standard a compromise, the supreme court stated, "[W]e wish to clarify the Schenk exception .... We also
wish to tailor the exception to conform to standards utilized by jurisdictions which have
limited parent-child negligence actions to a more discernible area." Id. at 728.
214. Id. at 729.
215. Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198; see also Grobart, supra note 1, at 320-21.
216. Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
217. See Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.

632

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 25

Furthermore, before Cates, Illinois courts had previously formulated
several exceptions to this general rule.218 In sum, Wisconsin and
Illinois base their standards on very different philosophies: while
Wisconsin grants immunity as an exception, Illinois grants immunity
as the general rule.219
Due to this distinction, the supreme court's apparent compromise
between prior Illinois decisions and the Goller standard will foster
considerable confusion. The Cates decision leaves unclear exactly
how Illinois' new standard relates to Illinois' previously recognized
exceptions. Should Illinois courts apply the Cates standard in every
parent-child tort action, or just automobile negligence cases? Should
the Cates standard ever come into play in contribution actions or in
cases where death has dissolved the family relationship? Should
courts consider the Cates standard only in cases that would potentially
involve either the family purpose exception or the duty-to-the-generalpublic exception? Questions such as these, which were left unanswered by the Cates decision, will be addressed in Part V of this Note.
C. Full Abrogation: The Missing Step in the Cates Compromise
The Cates court could have avoided causing confusion by simply
taking its compromise one step further. The court should have
adopted both the Goller standard and its underlying philosophy. In
other words, the court should have fully abrogated the doctrine of
parental immunity, except in situations where the alleged wrongful
conduct involves an exercise of parental authority or discretion. Or, to
mirror the language of the Cates majority, the court could have directed
that parental immunity be denied as a rule, except when the alleged
wrongful conduct inherently relates to the parent-child relationship.
Abrogation of parental immunity would certainly create less confusion than the majority's attempt to retain the doctrine. This approach
also seems more practical than the dissent's call for legislation on the

218. Id. at 722-26; see supra notes 61-97 and accompanying text.
2 19. The Cates court provided only a vague explanation of the differences it saw
between Wisconsin's approach and the one it adopted in Cates. The court first noted that
unlike the Goller standard, the Cates standard does not enumerate the parental duties that
enjoy immunity. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729. The court then stated, "The standard we
have created is not ... as extreme because we do not fully abrogate the immunity, but
rely on an exception." Id.
Unfortunately, it remains unclear to which exception the Cates court was referring
when stating that Illinois' approach relies on an "exception." This "exception" could
be the actual Cates standard or one of Illinois' previously recognized exceptions. See
infra notes 231-50 and accompanying text.
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issue. 220 After all, it was the courts, and not the legislature, that
adopted parental immunity. 22' Likewise, courts, not the General
Assembly, created the numerous exceptions to this doctrine.222 The
legislature's lack of involvement 223 indicates that it has no interest in
designing a statutory framework to address the numerous issues raised
by parent-child tort litigation.
Consequently, the responsibility for shaping the doctrine of
parental immunity properly lies with the judiciary. The Cates court
rightly took on this responsibility. Yet, the court stopped short of
fully abandoning parental immunity. Thus, with the status of several
exceptions to the doctrine unclear, the supreme court's attempted
compromise leaves Illinois law on parental immunity open to several
interpretations.224
V. IMPACT

The Cates decision leaves several questions unresolved about when
and how parent-child immunity should be applied. The supreme court
made it clear that parent-child tort immunity remains the general rule in
Illinois. 225 The Cates court also indicated that when facing the question of whether to apply immunity, courts should ask whether the
allegedly negligent conduct uniquely relates to the parent-child
relationship. 6 Yet, the court failed to clarify whether this standard
essentially replaces, in whole or in part, the five previously established
exceptions to parent-child tort immunity. 27
As a result, the Cates decision supports at least three conflicting
interpretations. First, the Cates standard arguably replaces all five of
the previously recognized exceptions to parent-child tort immunity in

220. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 730-731 (Miller, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief
Justice Miller stated, "I believe that abrogation of the immunity doctrine, whether in
whole or in part, should be accomplished through legislative action, and not by judicial
fiat." Id. at 731; see supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
221. See Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577, 580 (1895); Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 718.
222. See supra notes 61-97 and accompanying text.
223. The only legislation potentially implicating the parental immunity doctrine
provides immunity to Illinois teachers. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 105, §§ 5/24-24, 5/3484(a) (West 1992) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, V[ 24-24, 34-84(a) (1991)). These
provisions basically codify the holdings of the supreme court in Kobylanski v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705 (Il1. 1976) and in Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 395 N.E.2d 538
(I11. 1979).
224. See infra notes 225-50 and accompanying text.
225. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.
226. Id.
227. See infra notes 231-50 and accompanying text.
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Illinois.228 Second, the Cates standard may merely combine the family
purpose and the duty-to-the-general-public exceptions.229 In effect,
then, the standard would not apply in cases invoking the other three
exceptions to parental immunity. A third possible reading of Cates
limits its precedential effect only to cases arising from similar facts.
Thus, Cates might merely constitute a sixth exception, one that eliminates parental immunity in actions involving automobile accidents.230
These three interpretations are discussed in turn below.
A. ReplacingAll Five Exceptions to Parent-ChildTort Immunity
Perhaps the supreme court has replaced the five previously recognized exceptions to parental immunity with a new standard. This
would cause Illinois courts to treat the Cates standard as the only
exception to parental immunity and to abandon the previously recognized exceptions.
For example, in a case where a child sued the estate of a dead
parent, before Cates, the child would have relied on the exception to
parental immunity for dissolved family relationships developed in
Johnson v. Myers. 23' The child would claim that the parent's death
dissolved any relationship protected by immunity.232 However, the
Cates standard might lead to a different result. Applying Cates, a court
might inquire whether the alleged conduct inherently related to the
parent-child relationship.233 If it did, the estate could establish
immunity by arguing that while living, the defendant parent had a right
under Cates to exercise parental authority and discretion.
Similar twists may arise in cases invoking the Nudd exception,234
the oldest exception to parent-child immunity, under which the plaintiff
alleges willful and wanton conduct.235 Under Nudd, a child plaintiff
could successfully sue a physically abusive parent for assault or
battery. Now, under Cates, the parent might respond that the alleged
conduct inherently related to parental authority and discretion. The
228. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text.
230. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text. This was the solution originally reached by the appellate court in Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330, 335 (I11.App.
Ct. 1992).
231. 277 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this exception as embodied in Johnson.
232. See, e.g., Johnson, 277 N.E.2d at 779.
233. See Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.
234. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of this exception.
235. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (111.1956).
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parent would essentially try to convince the court that the new Cates
standard applies in all tort actions between parents and children.
In sum, if Illinois courts interpret Cates as replacing all of the previously recognized exceptions to parent-child tort immunity, they will
probably never again apply the five previously established exceptions.
B. A Combinationof Two Previously Recognized Exceptions
Another plausible interpretation of Cates is that its new standard is a
clarification of two previously recognized exceptions. The Cates
standard could be seen as merely clarifying confusion over the family
purpose and the duty-to-the-general-public exceptions in Illinois.236
Accordingly, the Cates standard would have no effect on the other
three exceptions to parental immunity.
There is no doubt that the Cates court approved of the family
purpose exception. 7 Still, as the court acknowledged, the exception
has caused some confusion, especially in automobile negligence
cases. 238 For instance, while some courts have held that the particular
act of driving falls outside the family purpose, other courts have
focused on whether the reasons for driving, such as transportation to
piano lessons, amounted to a family use.239
Despite this divergence, the Cates court agreed with the philosophy
underlying both the family purpose and the duty-to-the-general-public
exceptions. 240 Like the courts that formulated these exceptions, the
Cates court explained that the mere existence of a family relationship
does not absolve parents of their duties to the general public.24 1
Instead, parents owe such duties to their own children as well as to the
general public.242
The Cates court based its new standard on this rationale.243 Thus,
cases that may have supported application of the family purpose or
duty-to-the-general-public exceptions in the past would now support
application of the Cates standard. Instead of asking whether the
alleged wrongful conduct fell outside the family purpose or implicated
236. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 728. Support for this interpretation lies in the court's
assertion that it has "considered the reasoning of [the family purpose exception in]
Schenk as well as [the general public exception in] Cummings and approve[s] of those
exceptions." Id. at 726.
237. Id. at 728.
238. Id. at 723-26.
239. Id. at 725; see supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
240. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 726.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 728.
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a duty owed to the general public, courts would now inquire244whether
the conduct inherently related to the parent-child relationship.
It remains unresolved whether the Cates standard applies only in
situations that would have allowed application of these two exceptions.
If this is the case, Illinois would now recognize four exceptions to
parental immunity: the willful and wanton conduct exception, the
death of a party exception, the contribution exception, and, now, the
Cates parent-child relationship exception. This interpretation is
possible because the supreme court failed to address how its new
standard affects the other three exceptions to parental immunity. Thus,
while some courts may treat the Cates standard as a replacement for all
of Illinois' previously recognized exceptions, other courts may
interpret the Cates standard as only a modified combination of the
family purpose and duty-to-the-general-public exceptions.
C. Merely an Automobile Accident Exception?
The appellate court in Cates expressly recognized a sixth exception
to parent-child immunity in cases involving automobile accidents. 45
Although it affirmed the appellate court's decision, the supreme court
refrained from expressly adopting this sixth exception.24 6
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity present in the Cates decision may
ultimately limit its reach to automobile negligence cases alone.
First, the supreme court's characterization of the issues before it
created ambiguity over whether the court formulated a new standard or
merely recognized a sixth exception. The court inquired whether the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine bars a minor plaintiff's action alleging the negligent operation of an automobile. 247 By framing this
inquiry so narrowly, the court suggested that Cates would apply only
in cases involving automobile accidents. 2 8
244. Id. at 729.
245. Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
246. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729. Instead, the court applied its new general standard to
the specific facts of Cates and concluded that "the negligent operation of an automobile
is not conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship." Id.
247. Id.
248. The court's brief statement of procedural history is also potentially deceptive:
[T]he appellate court declined to fashion a rule abolishing the doctrine as
concerning the general area of negligence and decided to partially abrogate in
cases of automobile negligence. In doing so, the court stated that it was
mindful of a number of factors, including that automobile insurance is mandatory in Illinois. The appellate court thus reversed and remanded. We granted
defendant's petition for leave to appeal. We now affirm the appellate court.
Id. at 716 (citations omitted).
Like the supreme court's statement of the issues in Cates, this account of the case's
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Consequently, courts may disagree on whether the Cates standard
should be applied in all parent-child tort litigation. 249 This uncertainty
over how and when to apply Illinois' new standard may ultimately lead
courts to avoid the Cates decision. One way to do so would be to
distinguish Cates on the facts in cases not arising from automobile
accidents.
This third possible interpretation of Cates would be an undesirable
one. Although the supreme court set out to modify and improve
Illinois' approach to parental immunity,250 courts interpreting Cates

may unfortunately see only one narrow message: Parental immunity is
not available as a defense in parent-child litigation arising from automobile accidents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity has evolved considerably
since Mississippi first implemented it in 1891.251 In Cates v. Cates,
Illinois reevaluated its position on parent-child tort immunity.252
Striking a compromise between past Illinois decisions and
Wisconsin's approach, the supreme court ruled that Illinois will afford
immunity for conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship.253 Yet
the Cates court failed to address the precise effect this standard will
have on Illinois' previously recognized exceptions to parental immunity. As a result, Illinois law on parent-child tort immunity stands
open to several conflicting interpretations.2 Until the supreme court
revisits this issue, confusion among lower courts will persist in tort
litigation between parents and children.
COLLEEN M. DANAHER

procedural history also implies that the court is concerned only with automobile accidents. While it states that it reached the same conclusion as the appellate court, the
supreme court carelessly refrains from mentioning that it used an entirely different
reasoning process to reach this conclusion.
249. See supra notes 231-50 and accompanying text.
250. See Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 728.
251. See supra notes 22-136 and accompanying text.
252. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 722-25; see supra notes 154-203 and accompanying text.
253. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.
254. See supra notes 231-50 and accompanying text.

